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Abstract 
In this paper, in order to model breach of contract risk, we design and value a bundled option that 
is composed of contract abandonment and price renegotiation. We numerically show that the 
bundled option is more valuable for the contract than either of the options, i.e., contract 
abandonment and price renegotiation, in isolation. This value increases monotonically as the spot 
price becomes more volatile. The value of the bundled option is less than the sum of the 
individual option values, hence showing the sub-additive property. We demonstrate that in the 
presence of high spot price volatility, the bundled option is more valuable when renegotiation 
date is selected to be closer to the half-life of the contract. We also show that early contract 
abandonment probability goes down in the presence of renegotiation option. We conclude that the 
commodity supplier should negotiate a supply chain contract with flexible options at the design 
stage with the buyer, obtaining contract abandonment and price renegotiation options –as a 
bundled option—in order to enhance the supply contract value and reduce the breach of contract 
risk. 
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1. Introduction  
 
In different industries worldwide, executives state that designing flexible options in 
supply chain contracts creates value and mitigates operational risks for supply chain 
partners (IBM, 2009). It is imperative that the nature of this flexibility and risk needs to 
be carefully delineated. While managing supply chain contracts with suppliers 
worldwide, supply chain executives become increasingly concerned specifically about 
operational risk events such as breach of contract, supplier non-performance, improper 
business practices, and other supplier/vendor failures, which are classified by Basel II 
framework under the “Clients, Products, and Business Processes” as well as the 
“Execution, Delivery, and Process Management” categories. (Cruz (2002), Chernobai, 
Rachev, Fabozzi (2007), Hoffman (2002)). To hedge these operational risks, firms can 
use operational risk derivatives, insurance, and capital allocation methods (Cruz, 2002). 
Operational risk derivatives consist of different real and financial options as well as 
bonds and swaps. In this paper, we develop a method to value a particular type of flexible 
option, which is a bundle of abandonment and renegotiation options, designed into 
supply chain contracts. To that end, we shed light on the strategic use of renegotiation 
option in operational risk management. We show that not only the presence of this type 
of option, but also the timing of it, becomes important in supply chain contract valuation 
and operational risk mitigation. 
 
This paper derives some motivation from the previous work by Haksöz and Seshadri 
(2007) where the abandonment option is valued for the seller of the commodity in which 
abandonment option allows the seller to breach the contract at any time and sell to the 
spot market. In our paper, we build on a similar model by introducing a formal 
renegotiation option, which we show to be quite useful in today's highly volatile markets. 
Nowadays, many buyers and sellers of different commodities, such as steel, iron ore, 
aluminum, zinc, and pulp prefer to revise and renegotiate the contract parameters via a 
negotiation process where the result is uncertain. Sometimes, these renegotiation 
processes create favorable results, yet sometimes they end in deadlocks and may lead to 
undesirable breach of contracts. A breach of contract is considered to be a type of 
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operational risk that is classified under the “Clients, Products, and Business Practices” 
category of the Basel II framework (Cruz (2002), Haksöz and Kadam (2009)). Hence, a 
method to model breach of contract risk will be highly desirable for procurement and 
supply chain executives. 
 
Steel markets and its recent evolution is an interesting case in point. Until the summer of 
2008, commodity prices at London Metal Exchange have appreciated and the spot 
markets were more beneficial for commodity traders. ArcelorMittal, the largest 
steelmaker in the world, claimed that it sold around 20% of its steel capacity via fixed 
price supply contracts, and the rest to the spot market according to Matthews (2008a).  
On the other hand, with increasing firm bankruptcies around the financial world and the 
real sector, commodity prices started to plummet. In this case, commodity players began 
to breach their supply contracts due to much lower demands for end products such as 
automotive, construction, hardware goods etc. As noted by Matthews (2008b) iron ore 
buyers turned towards the spot market instead of paying much higher negotiated contract 
prices to the sellers. One such example is the case of Australian iron-ore producer Mount 
Gibson Iron Ltd. stating that in November 2008, three of Mount Gibson Iron’s customers 
had defaulted on their contracts to purchase iron ore in the spot market. Also, in our 
private communication with the Chief Risk Officer of Sabancı Group, the second largest 
industrial and financial conglomerate in Turkey, we learned that a firm in his industrial 
group was contemplating how to manage the default risk of a one year fixed price supply 
chain contract, as the supplier had asked for a %50 price increase in the contract as better 
price offers from competitors are available in the market (Saka, 2009).  
 
It is clear from examples above that both parties in a supply contract may benefit from 
renegotiating the contract terms, especially the price, rather than being exposed to breach 
of contract event. Surely, a breach of contract may increase the reputational risk of that 
firm in its industry, which may eventually damage long-term relationships with other 
potential partners. Thus, in this paper, we propose a formal renegotiation option with an 
abandonment option in a bundle that will be designed into a supply chain contract at the 
beginning of the contract. To our knowledge, this particular type of bundled option does 
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not exist in real world contractual arrangements. Hence, in this paper, we aim to propose 
a novel approach in modeling the breach of contract risk through a bundled option. To 
that end, our work also sheds some light on the optimal supply chain contract design 
literature (See Cachon (2003) and references therein). 
 
The definition of the renegotiation option in our setting is as follows: As time goes on 
while the procurement is made via a long term fixed price contract, spot market price 
may go up or down in the commodity market.  The renegotiation option uses the spot 
price at the time of the renegotiation to determine the forward contract price. In the 
absence of the renegotiation option, both parties would go through an uncertain 
renegotiation process where the renegotiated contract price could not be known with 
certainty. Once the renegotiation option is exercised, if the renegotiated contract price is 
not accepted, the supplier may breach the contract, i.e., formally exercise the 
abandonment option, and sell to the spot market. If the renegotiated price is accepted, the 
contract continues with the revised price until the contract duration or until a contract 
abandonment occurs. In such a setting, we show that the buyer reduces the breach of 
contract risk of the supplier ex post by offering the contract price renegotiation option ex 
ante.  
 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the related literature to our 
work. In Section 3, we provide our model of a bundled option. Next, we present our 
numerical solution approach for this bundled option in Section 4. In Section 5, we 
provide the model results and discuss managerial insights and practical significance. 
Finally, we conclude with a summary of main findings and future research directions in 
Section 6.  
 
2. Related Literature 
 
Our work is mainly related to two streams of literature. One is the work in supply chain 
contracts and procurement in commodity markets. The second relevant literature is the 
financial and real options valuation for multiple options.  
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In supply chain contracts literature, value of flexibility in contract design and 
management has been under focus for some time. Provision of options such as flexible 
quantity, revenue/cost sharing, buyback, and contract abandonment (Cachon (2003), 
Haksöz and Seshadri (2007)) create value for supply chain partners and provide benefits 
for managing risks in supply chain contracts.  In the presence of spot markets, buyers 
may use long-term contracts, option contracts and the spot market simultaneously for 
procurement. Seifert, Thonemann, Hausman (2004) study a single period model where a 
forward contract and spot market are used. Yet, in their model, no link exists between the 
forward contract and the spot market as one would expect in the commodity markets.  
Barnes-Schuster, Bassok, Anupindi (2002) show that backup agreements, quantity 
flexibility, pay-to-delay capacity reservation contracts are special cases of a general 
flexible options contract that enables buyers better manage demand risk. Martínez-de-
Albéniz and Simchi-Levi (2005) develop a portfolio model of procurement with three 
alternatives such as fixed-price long term contracts, option contracts, and spot market 
trading in order to manage demand and price risks.  
 
Haksöz and Seshadri (2007) review the extant literature on supply chain models in the 
presence of spot markets. Recently, in operational risk management, some research for 
contract default/breach risk has been conducted. In the presence of breach of contract risk 
by the suppliers, the buyers need to compute the supply risk exposure. For a portfolio of 
commodity suppliers, Haksöz and Kadam (2009) provide a risk assessment method based 
on CreditRisk+ model in the presence of a spot market.  
 
On renegotiation, there is a large literature in economics (See for example Tirole (1986) 
and references therein).  In supply chain literature, however, renegotiation has begun to 
appear rather recently. Plambeck and Taylor (2007) show that simple fixed quantity 
contracts with renegotiation design can coordinate investment in capacity and innovation 
for biopharmaceutical and semiconductor industries. In their work, renegotiation is 
modeled in a cooperative game theoretic setting that is different from our approach.  
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In financial and real options literature, there are a number of papers that provide some 
directions in valuation of interacting options, which are most relevant to our work. One of 
the pioneering articles in the real option valuation that shows the importance of option 
interactions is by Trigeorgis (1993). In his work, interactions among multiple real options 
such as deferral, abandonment, contraction, expansion, and switch use have been 
demonstrated numerically.  One of the key results of his paper is that combined value of 
multiple options is different than the sum of each option’s value in isolation. Option 
interactions may increase/decrease the combined value based on the nature and 
magnitude of different options. On the other hand, we should note that very few studies 
have been done to value the option interactions analytically. Studies by Agliardi (2006, 
2007) demonstrate the value interactions analytically for only two (expansion or 
contraction) options. Agliardi (2007) shows that addressing more than two options is 
technically doable and may create more flexibility, yet increases the mathematical 
complexity by having to work with nested multinomial cumulative functions. 
 
Last but not least, there is also a growing literature that studies a variety of exotic options 
that offers the flexibility to the option holder to change his strike price or maturity date 
(reset option), extend the length of the maturity (extendible option), choose a maximum 
of a call and put at fixed or flexible time points (chooser option). Our paper also relates to 
this stream of work. (See for example Detemple and Emmerling (2009), Dai and Kwok 
(2005), Gray and Whaley (1999)). We should point out that these flexible options are 
structurally different than compound options where the option holder gains another 
option by exercising his previous option (Geske, 1979).  
 
3. The Model 
 
Our model is developed for a fixed-price supply chain contract. The contract duration is 
given by [0,T]. At time 0, the contract is signed between a supplier and a buyer to procure 
a fixed amount of commodity, Q at unit price F0,T to be delivered at time T. This contract 
is essentially a commodity forward contract in our framework and the forward price is 
given by the following equation when the risk-free interest rate, r is non-stochastic. 
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where S0 is the spot market price at time 0 and δ is the convenience yield. As time moves 
on, the spot market price is assumed to evolve with a stochastic process assumed to be 
Geometric Brownian Motion, i.e., 
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Sα  is the  expected growth rate (drift) of the spot market price, Sσ is the instantaneous 
volatility of the spot market price, and SdW is the standard Wiener process. 
 
In this contract, the supplier is provided with two types of options in a bundle. We define 
these options below.  
 
Abandonment Option: This option entitles the supplier to abandon the supply contract 
at any time before the end of the contract duration by paying a positive abandonment 
penalty fee denoted by A. This is an American call option. Note that this fee is A at time 0 
and grows with given interest rate, i.e., Aert, therefore a higher amount at the time of the 
option exercise. We consider the time value of money in these penalty fee computations. 
Otherwise, the option holder may delay the option exercise as having paid the fixed 
amount at the beginning of the contract.  
 
Renegotiation Option: This option entitles the supplier to renegotiate the price of the 
contract by paying a positive renegotiation cost, R, at fixed time τ, T≤≤ τ0 , when the 
price of the contract is revised based on the spot price at τ, Sτ. Essentially, the contract 
price is revised to become ))((,
τδ
ττ
−−= TrT eSF . This is a European call option. Again, the 
renegotiation cost is payable at the exercise of the option, therefore it is assumed to grow 
at risk-free interest rate. 
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We assume that the abandonment penalty fee, A is larger than the renegotiation cost R, 
A>R. This assumption is valid since the firms will be paying larger amounts of penalties 
if they default and abandon their contracts. 
 
Merton (1973) shows that “an option on a portfolio is worth less than a portfolio of 
options”, thus yields the sub-additive property. However, if one has sequential real 
options such as those defined in Agliardi (2006, 2007), then one can achieve super-
additive (sub-additive) value if two real options are sequential expansion (contraction). 
Moreover, aforementioned, Trigeorgis (1993) shows numerically that multiple options in 
a real investment project cannot be valued as simple summation of their individual option 
values. The inherent interaction between these options has to be taken into account 
explicitly. Depending on their option types, whether an American or European and 
call/put, the combined value can be super or sub-additive.1 Thus, we need to note that in 
this paper, we study neither an option on a portfolio nor multiple real options as defined 
by Trigeorgis (1993), but we have a much more complicated bundled option for which no 
analytical solution exists. However, as also noted by a referee, unlike many real options, 
this bundled option conforms much better to the assumptions required to apply standard 
option pricing theory since the underlying asset for the contract is actually a physical 
commodity. Hence, the arbitrage trade that option pricing formulae depend on can 
potentially be executed in the marketplace.  
 
Specifically, we have an American call option for the duration [0,T] and we do have a 
European call option at time τ. This is structurally similar to an American-style reset call 
option where at time τ the strike price is reset from F0,T and Fτ,T. Gray and Whaley (1999) 
proposes a numerical procedure for valuing American-style reset put options. In our 
solution, we develop and use a method inspired by their approach.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Sub-additivity property states that evaluating the function for the sum of two elements in a particular domain always 
yields values less than or equal to the sum of the function's values at each element. Super-additive function is the 
negative of sub-additive function.  
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4. Numerical Solution Approach 
 
In this section, we develop a numerical solution approach for valuing the bundled option 
(abandonment and renegotiation) that is written in the supply chain contract.  We apply a 
modified version of the binomial tree method developed by Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein 
(1979). This modification was first proposed by Gray and Whaley (1999) for valuing 
American-style reset put options. A reset put (call) option is similar to a standard put 
(call) option except that the strike price is reset equal to the asset price on the pre-
specified reset date if this asset price is above (below) the original strike price. If this 
option is American, it can be exercised early before or after this pre-specified reset date. 
 
As explained earlier, the bundled option in this paper is structurally equivalent to an 
American-style reset-strike call option. It is an American-style call option since we have 
the right to abandon a short forward position by getting into a long forward contract at the 
same forward price at any time. Furthermore, it is a reset-strike option since the 
renegotiation helps change the forward price (i.e., the strike price) to a favorable one on a 
pre-specified date. However, there are subtle differences arising from the nature of these 
supply chain contracts. First, in the options-embedded supply chain contracts, penalty 
costs must be paid only when these options are exercised; whereas in standard options, 
premiums are paid up front. To adjust for this difference and to reduce a potential bias 
towards early exercise due to having constant penalty costs over time, we compound 
these penalty costs at the risk-free rate as we go further in time. This modeling feature is 
also aligned with industrial practice. The penalties paid for a later abandonment are much 
higher than early ones. Second, as these are short forward contracts, the strike (i.e., 
forward price) is reset when forward prices at the renegotiation date sufficiently goes 
above (not below) the original forward price. 
 
In our base case, we consider an 8-year supply chain contract2 where the supplier has an 
option to abandon this contract at the end of any period during the life of the contract. We 
                                                 
2 8-year supply chain contract can be also considered as a generic 8-period contract without loss of generality, where 
periods could be considered as one month to a quarter depending on the specific supply chain in focus. 
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assume that when the supplier abandons the contract, she will immediately sell the 
product in the spot market and receive the proceeds. Furthermore, the supplier also has an 
option to renegotiate the forward price at the end of the year four (i.e., half-way through). 
As a result, if the forward price at the end of the 4th year is favorable (i.e., higher enough 
to cover the cost of renegotiation), this becomes the new contract price. It should be noted 
that if abandonment takes place before the renegotiation date (end of year 4), the 
renegotiation cannot take place as the product is already sold in the spot market (i.e., the 
bundled option dies just like an abandonment option). However, in case a renegotiation 
takes place at the end of year four, abandonment is possible afterwards. That is to say, the 
abandonment component of the bundled option is still alive even if the renegotiation right 
is exercised. This bundled option therefore creates flexibility for both parties in revising 
the contract price in the middle of the contract duration. Price changes in the spot market 
could be reflected formally in the contract price. 
 
The binomial tree for spot prices is calibrated according to Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein 
(1979). Valuation of abandonment and renegotiation options as single options is 
straightforward within this framework. For bundled option, however, the possibility of 
renegotiation creates an implicit path-dependency that complicates the valuation 
procedure. To remedy this, we use the following modifications similar to those proposed 
in Gray and Whaley (1999). 
 
The renegotiation date (τ) breaks the binomial tree into two parts. The first part is an 
American abandonment option with a terminal date τ. For sub-trees emanating from each 
tree node on this date, we value two American abandonment options: with and without 
renegotiated prices. The terminal values of these options are given respectively as 
follows: 
 
( ),max ,R rTT T TV QS Ae QFτ= −  and ( )0,max ,rTT T TV QS Ae QF= − . 
 
For either option, at each node on the sub-tree prior to these terminal nodes, standard 
American option valuation routine is used, implying a value function in the form 
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[ ]( )max ,rt r tt t t tV QS Ae e E V− ∆ +∆= −  for a node at time t. The only exception is the root 
node for the sub-tree with renegotiated prices, where we also subtract the cost of 
renegotiation, rR e τ× , from this max function. The value of the bundled option on each 
node at time τ is the greater of the value of these two options. This comparison also gives 
whether it is optimal to renegotiate or not for this specific node.  
 
It should be noted that, regardless of the cost of renegotiation, it will never be optimal to 
renegotiate if , 0,T TF Fτ ≤ . Therefore, for nodes where
( )
0
rS S e δ ττ
−≤ , we do not analyze the 
sub-tree with renegotiated prices. Finally, having found the value of the bundled option 
on each of the nodes on the renegotiation date, we use the value function above to 
proceed backwards in time until t = 0, at which point we have the value of the supply 
chain contract with the bundled option.  
 
Figure 1 illustrates the implementation of the procedure for our base case assuming a 
further simplification of 1-year step-size. In the case of reset strike options, resetting the 
strike is a trivial procedure based on comparing the spot price and the strike price, 
therefore the comparison explained above is not needed. In the case of our bundled 
option, renegotiation penalty cost complicates the situation and necessitates a 
comparison, therefore our approach deviates slightly from that of Gray and Whaley 
(1999). 
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Figure 1. Binomial tree illustrating the procedure for bundled option valuation. The legend on the lower 
right shows the value functions for respective nodes. The sub-tree on the upper right represents one such 
sub-tree assuming the renegotiation option is exercised on a given node. 
 
Table 1 summarizes the parameter values for the binomial tree analysis. We remind that 
abandonment and renegotiation costs given below are present values of actual payments 
discounted at the risk-free rate. For example, if abandonment takes place at the end of 
period t, the payment will be rtA e× . This adjustment is done to prevent a bias that 
constant costs might create for late abandonment and also to create a similarity between 
option premiums and these penalty costs. 
 
Parameter Value 
Initial spot market price (S0) $100/ton 
Contract quantity (Q) 1,000 tons 
Contract term (T) 8 years 
Renegotiation date (τ) 4 years 
Spot price volatility (σ) 20% 
Abandonment cost (A) $40,000 
Renegotiation cost (R) $20,000 
Annual risk-free rate (r) 5% 
Annual average convenience yield (δ) 2.5% 
Binomial tree step-size (∆t) 0.01 years 
Table 1. Parameter values for the binomial tree model in the base case 
 
Although the base case parameter values are selected to represent a typical supply chain 
contract, we provide further justification for some of the parameters. The binomial tree 
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step-size, ∆t, is chosen based on the results of a convergence test. Figure 2 provides 
evidence and shows how the total contract value changes as number of tree steps 
increases (i.e., step-size decreases). Moreover, a step-size of 0.01 years corresponds to 2-
4 days, which appears to be a sufficient frequency to monitor spot prices for such long-
term contracts in practice.3 
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Figure 2. Convergence of total contract value in the presence of bundled option as number of tree-steps 
increases (i.e., the step-size decreases) 
 
Abandonment and renegotiation costs, A and R, are chosen to be compatible with other 
parameter values. For this purpose, we first assume that these costs are zero and we 
compute the incremental value of having these options mutually exclusively. For the base 
case, in which the value of the option-free contract is $81,873, we find that a free 
abandonment option increases the contract value by 28.04%, whereas a free renegotiation 
option adds 15.86%. This implies that the abandonment option is roughly twice as 
valuable as the renegotiation option. We keep this 2-to-1 ratio for the penalty costs but set 
them higher than their incremental values since the penalties are paid only when the 
options are exercised. 
 
 
                                                 
3 In our discussions with procurement executives, it is stated that frequency of spot price information 
monitoring intimately depends on the type of commodity purchased, market features, and supplier 
characteristics. In practice, 2-4 days monitoring frequency may reduce to daily checks or in some cases 
increase to bi-weekly examination. 
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5. Results and Discussion 
 
In this section, we present various results and discuss their managerial implications. 
 
5.1 Value of the Bundled Option 
 
Base case results suggest that bundled option adds value to either single option and this 
added value increases with volatility. However, the value of the bundled option is less 
than the sum of the values of the single options, i.e., aforementioned sub-additive 
property (Agliardi 2006, 2007). This finding is displayed in Figure 3 and emphasized by 
the following values. For the base volatility level of 20%, the incremental value (above 
the forward contract value of $81,873) of the abandonment option is $9,135 and that of 
the renegotiation option is $6,638. We find that the bundled option has an incremental 
value of $10,771, which implies that $5,002 = ($9,135 +$6,638) – $10,771 is lost due to 
option interaction. Figure 4 shows that the loss is also a non-decreasing function of 
volatility. 
 
It should be noted that in reality the abandonment option can only be exercised at certain 
pre-determined dates (e.g., at the end of each period/year). This characteristic would 
make the option a Bermudan-type one, which is a special case for American options. On 
the following charts, namely Figures 3, 6, and 7, we also present the results for the 
Bermudan abandonment option case in which the contract can only be abandoned at the 
end of each year. Clearly, the contract value is smaller than the comparable American 
option; however, the difference is too small to change our qualitative findings. 
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Figure 3. Total contract value in the presence of different type of abandonment and/or renegotiation 
options and its relationship with volatility of spot price 
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Figure 4. Loss due to interaction between abandonment and renegotiation options in the bundle for 
different dates of renegotiation and its relationship with volatility of spot price 
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5.2 Sensitivity on the Renegotiation Date 
 
We conduct sensitivity analysis for different renegotiation dates under different volatility 
assumptions and see if an early/late renegotiation date results in a higher value for the 
bundled option. In the absence of the abandonment option, regardless of the volatility 
level, extending the renegotiation date creates more value as shown in Figure 5. This is an 
expected result for European options on forward contracts as values of such options 
increase with time-to-maturity. Intuitively, if the supplier only has one opportunity to 
renegotiate, in the absence of contract abandonment option, she should select a date as 
close as possible to the contract maturity. However, as pointed out by a referee, should 
the supply contract were a swap, the option should reach its maximum value with a 
renegotiation date somewhere in the middle of the contract duration even in the absence 
of the abandonment option. Figure 5 also displays that for a given renegotiation date 
option value increases with volatility. 
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Figure 5. Total contract value in the presence of European renegotiation option with different maturities 
and its relationship with volatility of spot price 
 
On the other hand, for the bundled option we can only reach a similar conclusion in the 
presence of high spot price volatility. That is, as the volatility increases (beyond the base 
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case of 20%), the optimal renegotiation date that creates the most value shifts to the 
middle of the contract horizon (Table 2). This result can be best understood by analyzing 
the incremental value of the renegotiation option on top of the abandonment option. 
Under low volatility, extremely high prices are not too likely and a late and inexpensive 
renegotiation might be preferred to an early and expensive abandonment. On the other 
hand, when volatility is high, it is more likely to have very high prices early on and 
therefore the possibility of early abandonment is higher. This implies that having a too 
late renegotiation date might really be too late and add little value. When we look at the 
difference between the bundled option value and abandonment option value for different 
value of volatility and renegotiation dates, we find that for volatility values less than 
22.5%, τ = 7 seems to be the best date for renegotiation. For volatility values greater than 
40%, the optimal renegotiation date moves to τ = 4.  
Renegotiation Date (0 means no renegotiation) Total 
Contract 
Value 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2.5% 81.87 81.87 81.87 81.87 81.87 81.87 81.87 81.87 
5.0% 81.89 81.89 81.89 81.90 81.92 81.97 82.04 82.12 
7.5% 82.24 82.24 82.25 82.30 82.43 82.61 82.84 83.11 
10.0% 83.24 83.24 83.27 83.39 83.60 83.87 84.22 84.64 
12.5% 84.77 84.77 84.87 85.06 85.33 85.65 86.03 86.49 
15.0% 86.65 86.68 86.88 87.17 87.49 87.81 88.15 88.59 
17.5% 88.76 88.85 89.20 89.59 89.95 90.26 90.55 90.86 
20.0% 91.01 91.21 91.75 92.25 92.64 92.93 93.13 93.30 
22.5% 93.36 93.73 94.46 95.07 95.51 95.77 95.88 95.85 
25.0% 95.75 96.36 97.30 98.02 98.49 98.73 98.74 98.51 
27.5% 98.19 99.06 100.25 101.07 101.57 101.78 101.68 101.23 
30.0% 100.64 101.86 103.26 104.18 104.73 104.89 104.69 104.03 
32.5% 103.09 104.68 106.33 107.37 107.92 108.07 107.76 106.86 
35.0% 105.54 107.58 109.43 110.59 111.18 111.27 110.86 109.73 
37.5% 107.96 110.46 112.57 113.81 114.44 114.50 113.96 112.60 
40.0% 110.37 113.37 115.72 117.09 117.73 117.75 117.10 115.51 
42.5% 112.73 116.30 118.85 120.34 121.02 120.99 120.21 118.39 
45.0% 115.09 119.23 122.04 123.60 124.32 124.26 123.35 121.27 
47.5% 117.39 122.12 125.20 126.87 127.59 127.49 126.47 124.15 
50.0% 119.64 124.98 128.32 130.12 130.86 130.70 129.56 126.99 
52.5% 121.87 127.89 131.43 133.36 134.14 133.91 132.64 129.82 
55.0% 124.05 130.76 134.52 136.56 137.38 137.11 135.68 132.61 
57.5% 126.16 133.59 137.61 139.72 140.58 140.27 138.71 135.36 
S
p
o
t 
P
ri
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 V
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60.0% 128.22 136.38 140.66 142.88 143.73 143.38 141.70 138.09 
Table 2. Total contract value in the presence of bundled option with different renegotiation dates and its 
relationship with volatility of spot price. For each volatility level, the maximum contract value 
corresponding to the optimal renegotiation date is in bold text. 
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When volatility is low, date of the renegotiation option determines which option is 
dominant in the bundled option. If renegotiation can take place after the half-life of the 
contract, then the renegotiation option explains a significant portion of the value of the 
bundled option as displayed on the left part of Figure 6. Otherwise, the renegotiation 
option adds little value, as can be seen on the left part of Figure 7. Both figures show that 
for high volatility, having the bundled option really makes a difference above either 
single option (abandonment and renegotiation option) regardless of the renegotiation 
date. 
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Figure 6. Total contract value in the presence of different type of abandonment and/or renegotiation 
options for a late renegotiation date and its relationship with volatility of spot price 
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Figure 7. Total contract value in the presence of different type of abandonment and/or renegotiation 
options for an early renegotiation date and its relationship with volatility of spot price 
 
5.3 Optimal Abandonment Strategy 
 
We should note that the following analysis is conducted for only American type 
abandonment in the bundled option, disregarding the Bermudan type abandonment as 
their values are quite similar. Although the bundled option value is sub-additive and a 
large amount is lost due to the interaction between two options, the renegotiation option 
does change the optimal behavior of the supplier to a great extent. In Figure 8, the 
optimal early abandonment boundary price is displayed as a function of time for three 
cases: i) No renegotiation, ii) Renegotiation at the end of 6th year, and iii) Renegotiation 
at the end of 4th year. The plots display the spot prices above which it would be optimal 
to abandon the contract before a possible renegotiation (i.e., to abandon “early”). There 
are two important findings. First and more significant observation is that the minimum 
spot price that triggers an early abandonment is considerably higher in the presence of a 
renegotiation option. Furthermore, not even the highest possible price on the binomial 
tree can make it optimal to early abandon within about 2.5 years before the renegotiation 
date. The supplier finds it optimal to wait and renegotiate instead of abandoning the 
contract. Second observation is that the supplier slightly postpones the earliest optimal 
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early abandonment time in the presence of a renegotiation option as displayed by the 
right-shift in the left-end of the curves. Both of these findings point to an obvious result, 
that the early abandonment is much less likely in the presence of a renegotiation option. 
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Figure 8. Spot price boundaries which show the level above which it is optimal to abandon the contract 
prior to a possible future renegotiation for three different cases 
 
To emphasize this result, we feel obliged to calculate the early abandonment probabilities 
explicitly.4 In order to do this, for each tree-step, we first compute the number of nodes 
that are unreachable as a result of early abandonment using the boundary prices in Figure 
8. Next, we calculate the single-path probabilities for each node on the early 
abandonment boundary. Due to the re-combining structure of the binomial lattice, many 
paths may lead to the same node. Therefore, we determine the number of paths that lead 
to each early abandonment node without going through an earlier abandonment. This is 
not a trivial task since early exercise causes path-dependency. For each early 
abandonment node, we compute the paths that will arrive from earlier abandonment 
                                                 
4 As pointed out by a referee, these risk-neutral probabilities are not necessarily very close to true 
probabilities. 
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nodes using a recursive algorithm5 and subtract this from the total number of paths 
leading to that node. Finally, we multiply the single-path probability of each early 
abandonment node with the calculated number of paths and sum them over all such nodes 
to arrive at the probability of early abandonment. Our findings are even more striking 
than those from Figure 8. When there is no renegotiation option, the contract is optimally 
abandoned with a probability of 19.89%. When there is a renegotiation option at τ = 6, 
the probability that the contract will be abandoned prior to this date is a mere 0.14%. 
When the renegotiation date is pulled to τ = 4, this probability shrinks to 5*10–10. Hence, 
the presence of a renegotiation option creates an incentive for the supplier to postpone the 
contract abandonment. Moreover, the closer the renegotiation dates to the beginning of 
the contract, the lower the probability of contract abandonment. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, for a supply chain contract, we designed and valued a bundled option that is 
composed of contract abandonment (American type) and price renegotiation (European 
type). This bundled option was used to model breach of contract risk --being one of the 
critical operational risks in practice, which is classified by Basel II framework under 
“Clients, Products, and Business Processes” category. We numerically solved this 
bundled option valuation model in a Binomial setting and obtained the following 
managerial insights.  
 
First, the bundled option is more valuable for the contract than either of the options, i.e., 
contract abandonment and price renegotiation, in isolation. This value increases 
monotonically as the spot price becomes more volatile. However, the value of the 
bundled option is less than the sum of the individual option values, hence showing the 
sub-additive property, aligned with the previous literature. Second, as spot price volatility 
increases, one should prefer early renegotiation date. In the presence of low spot price 
volatility, if the renegotiation option can take place after the half-life of the contract, the 
bundled option value is significantly determined by the renegotiation option value. If the 
                                                 
5 The algorithm and its MATLAB code are available with the authors upon request. 
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renegotiation date is earlier than the half-life of the contract, then the renegotiation option 
adds little value. Therefore, in markets with low spot price risk, obtaining renegotiation 
options that are exercisable after the half-life of the contracts are more valuable in a 
bundled option. 
 
Third, having the renegotiation option changes the optimal strategy of the supplier 
(option holder). Early contract abandonment probability goes down in the presence of 
renegotiation option. Thus, offering a price renegotiation option to a supplier in a bundle 
with contract abandonment option is beneficial for the buyers such that favorable market 
conditions will not as much encourage the supplier for early abandonment. In sum, a 
price renegotiation option bundled with abandonment option may somewhat reduce the 
breach of contract risk. This managerial insight is also corroborated by Tirole (1986) for a 
different setting, in which renegotiation is shown to be valuable in the presence of breach 
of contract due to impossibility of initial contract enforcement.  
 
We provide a number of future research directions. Our model values a bundled option 
that is composed of two options only (contract abandonment and price renegotiation). In 
practice, one can potentially design multiple flexible options in a supply chain contract at 
the same time such as renegotiation of contract quantity, duration, payment terms etc. 
These added option valuations will naturally complicate the solution procedure. Yet, one 
can use a similar setting as ours for multiple interacting options. Furthermore, in this 
paper, we disregard any gaming possibility in the supplier-buyer relationship. A game 
theoretic model in which multiple options are available to both players will be another 
interesting extension. Last but not least, quantifying the impact of such a bundled option 
on operational risk exposure will be a fruitful study. We hope that our paper motivates 
more research in designing and valuing flexible options for supply chain contracts such 
that various operational risks can be better managed.  
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